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Abstract
We compare three diﬀerent elicitation methods for measuring risk attitudes of French farmers
in a ﬁeld experiment setting. We consider two experiments based on the lottery choices initially
proposed by Holt and Laury (2002) and by Eckel and Grossman (2002,2008), a risk-taking
psychological questionnaire and a self-reporting of perceived risk attitudes for diﬀerent domains.
The main empirical results from this within-subject study are the following. First, within the
class of lottery choices, risk preference measures are aﬀected by the type of mechanism used.
In particular, farmers appear to be more risk averse using the Eckel and Grossman lottery
than using the Holt and Laury one. However attitudes towards risk are signiﬁcantly correlated
across lotteries which means that the ranking of risk preferences seems to be preserved. Second,
risk preferences appear to be context-dependent. French farmers are highly risk averse for
decisions belonging to ﬁnancial and ethical domains. They report a higher willingness to take
risk for professional decisions. Lastly, using the psychological questionnaire, we ﬁnd that the risk
attitude elicited through lottery choices often correlates with risk attitude toward investments.
These ﬁndings contribute to the literature which addresses the stability of risk preferences across
elicitation methods.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Risk and uncertainty play a signiﬁcant role in almost every important economic decision. Since
people diﬀer in the way they take decisions involving risk and uncertainty and since these diﬀerences
are often described as diﬀerences in risk attitude, understanding individual risk preferences is a
prerequisite to understand economic behavior. As a result, numerous researchers have studied
individual risk attitudes in a variety of ﬁelds and settings, Blais and Weber (2006). Surprisingly
the diﬀerent methods used for measuring risk attitudes have been shown to result in diﬀerent
classiﬁcations of individuals. More importantly, even when using the same assessment method,
individuals have not shown themselves to be consistently risk seeking or risk averse, Schoemaker
(1990). Our main objective is to contribute to this literature by comparing the risk attitude elicited
by various methodologies on the same sample of subjects.
Controlled laboratory experiments have been used for a long time to study risk attitudes. Nu-
merous researchers have attempted to elicit certainty equivalents for lotteries through theoretically
truthfully revealing mechanisms such as the Becker, Degroot and Marshak (BDM) procedure. An
alternative approach that has been used extensively to measure risk attitudes is through observing
bids in private value auctions. Holt and Laury (2002) have developed a series of binary comparisons
in which the prizes are the same for each comparison but the probability of receiving the higher pay-
oﬀ varies across comparisons. Eckel and Grossman (2002,2008) have constructed a similar method
but hold the probabilities ﬁxed and vary the payoﬀs. A troubling result from this experimental
literature is that the degree of risk aversion of an individual varies across elicitation techniques over
similar sized stakes. For instance, Isaac and James (2000) compare individual risk attitudes elicited
using a ﬁrst-price auction and the BDM pricing procedure. They ﬁnd that subjects appear to be risk
averse in the ﬁrst-price auction but often risk-neutral in BDM. They also report that the ranking
across subjects of risk parameters is not preserved across the two elicitation methods. We pro-
pose to build on this recent literature by eliciting risk preferences using two diﬀerent lottery tasks,
namely the Eckel and Grossman mechanism (henceforth EG) and the Holt and Laury mechanism
(henceforth HL). These tasks have been extensively used and validated in various contexts.
A recent work by Deck et al. (2008) has suggested that the instability of risk preferences
across experimental tasks could be related to the fact that risk attitudes may vary depending on
the context. The literature in psychology has suggested that it is appropriate to consider risk
attitudes as a personality trait, Weber, Blais, and Betz (2002). While traits were initially deﬁned
as stable (i.e., situation invariant), empirical observations suggest that risk-taking is in fact highlydomain speciﬁc.1 With this in mind, psychologists have developed some tests to assess individual
willingness to engage in risky decision-making across a variety of domains. The Domain-Speciﬁc
Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) test provided by Weber, Blais, and Betz (2002) is an example of such a
psychologist test since it allows to identify risk preferences for seven diﬀerent domains (e.g., social,
recreational, health, safety, gambling, ethical, and investments). We propose to use a psychometric
questionnaire to assess subject risk preferences for various domains and we check if the HL and the
EG tasks provide a measure of risk preferences for the same domains or, on contrary, for diﬀerent
domains. If the HL and the EG tasks provide some measures of risk preferences for distinct domains,
one may understand why the level of risk aversion elicited through these two methods may vary.
Compared to the existing literature on risk preference elicitation, we use a ﬁeld experiment
approach and we consider a sample of French farmers. Although most of the literature on risk pref-
erence elicitation relies on laboratory experiments, Andersen et al. (2010) have recently stressed
that ﬁeld and laboratory experiments are in fact complementary tools. Hence, ﬁeld experiments
allow to extrapolate ﬁndings from the laboratory to a population of interest. If some works have
been conducted on sub-samples of the population presenting speciﬁc characteristics2,o n l yaf e w
studies have focused on risk preferences of farmers, especially in the context of developed coun-
tries.3 There are several reasons why eliciting risk preferences on a sample of farmers is worth
being undertaken. First, since farmers are used in their professional life to take decisions under
uncertainty (cropping choice is subject to production and market risks), instability in preferences
due to diﬀerences in cognitive diﬃculty across elicitation methods should be limited, Anderson and
Mellor (2008). Second, there is currently no consensus in the agricultural economics literature on
the level of farmer’s risk aversion, see Reynaud et al. (2009). Lastly, from a policy-oriented point
of view, a valid measure of risk attitudes is a critical input for properly designing agricultural price
or income support instruments.
Our results demonstrate that, within the class of lottery choices, risk preference measures are
aﬀected by the type of mechanism used. In particular, farmers appear to be more risk averse using
the EG lottery than using the HL one. Since attitudes towards risk are signiﬁcantly correlated
across lotteries, ranking of risk preferences seems however to be preserved across lottery tasks.
1MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1990) have showed that executive managers have diﬀerent risk attitudes when
making decisions involving personal versus company money or when evaluating ﬁnancial versus recreational risks.
2Kihlstrom and Laﬀont (1979) have proposed a framework in which entrepreneurs are less risk averse than the
rest of the population. This idea has resulted in an important empirical literature. For instance, Sarasvathy, Simon,
and Lave (1998) ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in risk preferences between entrepreneurs and bankers.
3Elicitation of farmer risk preferences in the context of developing countries is much more common. See for
instance the seminal works Binswanger (1980) and Quizon, Binswanger, and Machina (1984) who considered an
ordered lottery selection design to elicit risk preferences of Indian farmers. Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen (2009)
provide a more recent application of multiple price list methods to elicit risk preferences on a sample of Vietnamese
farmers.
3Second, risk preferences appear to be context-dependent. French farmers are highly risk averse
for decisions belonging to ﬁnancial and ethical domains. They report a higher willingness to take
risk for professional decisions. Lastly, using the psychological questionnaire, we ﬁnd that the risk
attitude elicited through lottery choices often correlates with risk attitude toward investments.
The remainer of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we survey studies that have em-
ployed a within-subjects design to assess the impact of using various elicitation methods to compare
risk preferences. Then, we describe our experimental design including the elicitation techniques and
the survey instruments. The results related to risk preferences are presented in Section 4. Lastly,
Section 5 is devoted the stability of risk attitude across the various elicitation techniques.
2 Relevant Literature
Several studies have reported that risk preferences may not appear stable across the design of
laboratory experiments.4 In this section, we focus exclusively on studies that have employed a
within-subjects design to compare various elicitation methods concerning risk preferences.
2.1 Stability across experimental tasks
Controlled laboratory experiments (lotteries for instance) have been used to study risk attitudes for
al o n gt i m e . 5 A troubling result from this experimental literature is that the degree of risk aversion
of an individual varies across elicitation techniques over similar sized stakes.
Isaac and James (2000) compare individual risk attitudes elicited through a ﬁrst-price auction
and the Becker, Degroot, and Marschack (BDM) pricing procedure. They ﬁnd that subjects appear
to be risk averse in the ﬁrst-price auction but often risk-neutral in BDM. They also report that
across subjects the ranking of risk parameters is not preserved across the two elicitation methods.
Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (2005) consider three diﬀerent mechanisms for eliciting individual
preferences namely the BDM pricing procedure, an English clock auction, and a ﬁrst-price auction.
They ﬁnd dramatic diﬀerences in elicited preferences and they report that subjects act as risk-loving
in the English clock auctions and as risk-averse in the ﬁrst-price auctions. Dave et al. (2007) elicit
4Andersen et al. (2008) have for instance addressed the issue of time stability whereas Kachelmeier and Shehata
(1992) or Holt and Laury (2002) have considered the relationship between elicited risk preferences and level or the
nature (real versus hypothetical) of ﬁnancial incentives.
5Numerous researchers have attempted to elicit certainty equivalents for lotteries through theoretically truthfully
revealing mechanisms such as the Becker, Degroot and Marshak procedure. An alternative approach to measuring
risk attitudes is through observing bids in ﬁrst price private value auctions as mentioned above. Holt and Laury
(2002) have developed a series of binary comparisons in which the prizes are the same for each comparison but the
probability of receiving the higher payoﬀ varies across comparisons. Eckel and Grossman (2002) have constructed a
similar method but hold the probabilities ﬁxed and vary the payoﬀs. Recently, Bruner (2009) also compares changes
in probability to changes in rewards. He concludes to the presence of substantial inconsistency in choices.
4individual risk preferences using two lottery tasks: the HL and the EG mechanisms. They ﬁnd that
the two tasks yield to diﬀerent risk preference estimates: subjects exhibit a greater risk aversion in
the HL task than in the EG one. They suggest that this diﬀerence may be attributed to the fact
that the HL task is cognitively more diﬃcult than the EG one.6 Hence, Dave et al. (2007) report
that excluding subjects with lower math ability leads to similar estimates of predictive accuracy
across the two experimental elicitation methods.
The question addressed by Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2004) is also related to our analysis.
They have developed an experimental design aimed at eliciting and measuring subject’s preferences
for two auction institutions, i.e. an ascending and a sealed-bid ﬁrst-price auction.7 Their main
ﬁnding is that while subjects exhibit strong preferences for the ascending auction (at equal entry
prices), they are not willing to pay up to the expected proﬁt diﬀerence between the two auctions
to participate in an ascending auction. Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2004) show that one possible
answer to the puzzle is that bidders are risk averse in their bidding behavior and also risk averse
to the same degree in their auction choice behavior. Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2008) introduce
loss aversion and aversion to the dynamic bidding process (ascending auction) as alternative ex-
planations. These two types of risk aversion cannot explain auction choice behaviors, leaving risk
aversion as the only remaining hypothesis.
2.2 Experimental tasks versus hypothetical gambles
Some works have compared the risk preferences elicited through an experimental task to the pref-
erences derived from a survey instrument which measures the degree of risk aversion directly albeit
based upon hypothetical responses.
Deck et al. (2008) consider two experimental tasks (the HL task and a variation of the game show
“Deal or No Deal”) and two hypothetical gambles. In the inheritance gamble, subjects are asked
how much of $100,000 in lottery winnings they would invest in an asset that would either double or
halve in value over the next two years. In the job gamble, respondents complete questions regarding
a hypothetical scenario in which they could accept a new job that would either double their income
or cut it by some fraction with equal probability. First, they ﬁnd that the risk preference obtained
with the HL and the Deal or No Deal tasks are not consistent.8 Second, with one exception, none
6The HL task involves ten decisions between gambles and allows categorization of decision makers into 10 risk
categories, while the EG task is simpler, involving a single choice among 6 gambles, but only allows categorization of
decision makers into 5 risk categories.
7Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2004) indicate that bidders may have preferences between these two auction mech-
anisms due to the strategic diﬀerences between them.
8However, since the size of the stakes for these tasks are not the same (the average payment in the Deal or No
Deal task is approximately six times that of the average payment in the HL task), it is diﬃcult to conclude that there
is a task impact on the level of risk preferences.
5of the pairwise correlation coeﬃcients between the experiment and survey-based risk preference
measures are statistically signiﬁcant. Anderson and Mellor (2008) compare the risk preferences
elicited through the HL task with the same hypothetical gamble (inheritance and job gambles).
They ﬁnd that risk preferences are not stable across elicitation methods. Whereas risk preference
estimates from the HL experiment are not associated with subject risk preference classiﬁcations
from job-based gambles, they report a signiﬁcant relationship with the inheritance-based gambles.
Anderson and Mellor (2008) suggest that individual characteristics such as cognitive comprehension
or eﬀort might help understand this discrepancy.
2.3 Experimental tasks versus psychological measures
In the psychological literature, risk attitude is viewed has a latent construct (i.e. a not directly
observable variable) that is measured by a set of observable variables (i.e. indicators that can be
answers from questions).
Deck et al. (2008) use the Weber et al. (2002) psychological risk attitude scale to risk preferences
across diﬀerent situations (social, recreational, health and safety, gambling, ethical, and investment).
They conclude that risk attitudes vary within subjects across elicitation methods (experimental
tasks versus psychological risk attitude measures). They show that risk attitude towards investment
decisions as measured by Weber et al. (2002) inﬂuences behavior in the HL task but not in Deal or
No Deal. On the contrary, attitudes towards gambling impact behavior in the Deal or No Deal task,
but not in the HL task. Deck et al. (2008) propose an explanation derived from the psychological
literature. The literature is psychology has suggested that risk attitudes may vary according to the
context, Weber et al. (2002). The HL task may be viewed by subjects as an investment task whereas
the Deal or No Deal could be associated to gambling. The fact that risk attitude towards investment
and gambling may be not the same may explain the discrepancy across elicitation methods reported
in Deck et al. (2008).
In Eckel and Grossman (2002,2008), subjects complete a simple 50/50 gamble task and a psy-
chological survey allowing to measure risk attitudes in four diﬀerent domains.9 None of the four
measures of risk attitude allows to signiﬁcantly explain the lottery choice. Eckel and Grossman
(2002) conclude that “psychological survey data are not a good predictor of behavior in an incen-
tivized environment where subjects must choose an actual gamble”. Another explanation could be
that the four domains considered in the psychological survey do not cover the risk domain which is
9The survey measures diﬀerent aspects of sensation seeking: the disinhibition (nonconformity with standards
of acceptable social behavior), the boredom susceptibility (aversion to routine), a thrill and adventure seeking fac-
tor (preference for the thrills inherent in risky activities) and experience seeking (preference for mentally arousing
activities and a nonconforming lifestyle).
6pertinent for using the EG lottery task choice.
Lastly, Dohmen et al. (2009) compare risk preferences elicited through a lottery choice to
self-reported measures of risk aversion in general and in ﬁve speciﬁc domains (car driving, ﬁnancial
matters, sports and leisure, health matters, and career).10 They conclude that the general risk
attitude question predicts actual behavior in the lottery quite well. They also show that although
self-reported risk attitudes are not perfectly correlated across contexts, the pairwise correlations are
large and all highly signiﬁcant. They attribute this result to the existence of a stable underlying
risk trait.
2.4 Summary
Most of the recent studies that have used various elicitation methods for assessing risk preferences
conclude that risk attitude estimates across methods are greatly unstable. Diﬀerent explanations
have been proposed. For some authors, the reason of this instability should be attributed to diﬀer-
ences in cognitive diﬃculty across elicitation methods, Anderson and Mellor (2008) or Dave et al.
(2007). The results obtained by Deck et al. (2008) suggest however that each experimental task
may in fact measure risk preferences corresponding to a speciﬁc domain.
3 Experimental Design
Given the ubiquitous nature of decision making under uncertainty in society, it is no wonder that
numerous researchers have studied risk attitudes in a variety of settings. To assess risk preferences,
we consider the three following methods:
• Stated preference approach based on ﬁnancial lotteries;
• Risk-taking psychological questionnaire;
• Self evaluation of risk attitude.
We present in this section the way we implement the three risk preference elicitation methods.
We ﬁrst describe the sampling design. Appendix A presents the diﬀerent tasks we have used and
Appendix B, the full experimental protocol.
10Subject were asked to evaluate the question “How do you see yourself: are you generally a person who is fully
prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?” on a 10 point scale going from “not at all willing to take
risks” to “very willing to take risks”. Subjects were also asked to evaluate the question for the ﬁve speciﬁc domains
mentioned above.
73.1 Sampling
Previous works have shown that, in terms of risk preferences, there is an important degree of
heterogeneity in the population, Dave et al. (2007). Hence, an accurate measure of risk preferences
should take into account this heterogeneity. However, in practice this is not a easy task since it is
usually diﬃcult to control for all potential sources of heterogeneity that may have an impact on
risk preferences (age, eduction, sex, revenues, etc.). Our strategy has been to consider a population
sub-sample in which we expect a lower heterogeneity across subjects and a higher stability of
risk preferences across tasks. Instead of using a sample of students, we have considered a sample
of French farmers who may be more homogeneous in terms of preferences than the rest of the
population. A strong motivation for eliciting risk preferences on a sample of farmers is that they
are used in their professional life to taking decisions under uncertainty (climate, production or
market uncertainty). We believe that they may be more easily able to compare lotteries in terms
of expected utility than the rest of the population. As a result the instability in preferences due to
diﬀerences in cognitive diﬃculty across elicitation methods might be limited. Another motivation is
that there is currently no consensus in the agricultural economics literature on the level of farmer’s
risk aversion especially in the context of developed countries (Reynaud et al. (2009)). We wish
to contribute to this literature by providing some experimental measures of French farmer’s risk
aversion. Lastly, from a policy-oriented point of view, a valid measure of risk attitudes is a critical
input for properly designing agricultural price or income support instruments. This is especially
important since the Common Agricultural Policy reform adopted in June 2003 has implemented
a new system for farm income support based on decoupling. Using a sample of Finnish farmers,
Koundouri et al. (2009) show for instance that there is a signiﬁcant relationship between farmers
degree of risk aversion and the level of EU subsidy decoupling.
Given the diﬃculties to organize a lab session with farmers, we decided to use a ﬁeld experiment
approach.11 First we selected three diﬀerent regions in France (Midi-Pyrénées, Poitou-Charentes,
Centre) and asked local extension services to provide a listing of farmers located in each area. In
order to get a quite homogeneous sample, we restricted the selection to cash crop producers using
irrigation. We then randomly selected 10 farmers in each region. None of them refused to take the
survey so our sample does not suﬀer a priori from a selectivity bias.
Given the substantial cost of using a survey ﬁrm, and the desire to have more control over
all aspect of the ﬁeld experiment, we decided to undertake the experiments by ourselves. The
survey was realized through face-to-face interviews from May to June 2009. The experimental
11In fact, our experimental framework corresponds to an artefactual ﬁeld experiment according to the Harrison and
List (2004) terminology.
8design was the last part of a 3-hour survey aiming at understanding farmer’s land use and crop
choices. For each subject, the experimental part which lasted around half an hour, was divided into
four sub-parts: two experimental lotteries, one personality test and a self-assessment questionnaire
of subjects risk attitude. A comprehensive introduction of the methods and goals, and scoreless
questions were necessary prior to the four tests to insure a good comprehension. In order to ensure
incentive compatibility, subjects are usually informed that after the experiment a random device
would determine how much they would be paid according to their decisions. Since, we have not
been allowed to pay the subjects, we had to rely on another mechanism. In order to ensure a
minimal level of incentives, farmers where explained that after the experiment they would receive
a personal risk assessment of their behavior that can be useful to them in their professional of
personal life. This personal risk assessment may be viewed as a non-monetary ﬁxed payment. Since
the experiment is based on a voluntary participation of all subjects, we believe that farmers interest
is high enough to insure that their answers reﬂect eﬀectively their real preferences. Moreover, Holt
and Laury (2002) or Harrison (2006) have found that there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in terms
of observed decisions between lottery choices using hypothetical or real payoﬀs.
3.2 Experimental design for stated preference measures
In the expected utility framework, diﬀerences in risk attitude are modeled by utility functions that
diﬀer in shape, with diﬀerent degrees of concavity to explain risk aversion. Controlled laboratory
experiments can then be used to study risk attitudes within this context. We consider two diﬀerent
tasks that have been extensively used in the experimental literature for eliciting risk preference. The
ﬁrst one is derived from Holt and Laury (2002) who have developed a series of binary comparisons
in which payoﬀs are the same for each comparison but probability of receiving the higher payoﬀ
varies across comparisons. We also adapt the task initially proposed in Eckel and Grossman (2002).
3.2.1 Adaptation of the Holt and Laury (HL) experiment
The ﬁrst lottery task is an adaptation of the well known “multiple price list” proposed by Holt and
Laury (2002) for the elicitation of risk attitudes. In the HL task, subjects are shown diﬀerent binary
lotteries and must select either option A (the “safe” lottery) or option B for each one (the “risky”
lottery). The payoﬀs for option A are ﬁxed at $2.00 and $1.60 while the payoﬀs for option B are
ﬁxed at $3.85 and $0.10. As noted by Holt and Laury, the payoﬀs for the safe lottery (Option A)
are less variable than those for the risky lottery (Option B). In each successive row, the likelihood
of receiving the larger payoﬀ increases. In the ﬁnal row there is no uncertainty and monotonicity
9alone is suﬃcient to lead a person to select option B. By assuming constant relative risk aversion,
the subject risk aversion is then directly related to the line at which he switches from preferring
option A to preferring option B going down the table.
Table 1: Adaptation of Holt and Laury task
Option A Option B Implied Range CRRA
Prob. 1 Prob. 2 Payoﬀ 1 Payoﬀ 2 Payoﬀ 1 Payoﬀ 2 of CRRA codea
1/10 9/10 20.0 16.0 38.5 1.0 r ≤ -0.95 RL3
2/10 8/10 20.0 16.0 38.5 1.0 r ≤ -0.95 RL3
3/10 7/10 20.0 16.0 38.5 1.0 -0.95 < r ≤ -0.49 RL2
4/10 6/10 20.0 16.0 38.5 1.0 -0.49 < r ≤ -0.15 RL1
5/10 5/10 20.0 16.0 38.5 1.0 -0.15 < r ≤ 0.15 RN
6/10 4/10 20.0 16.0 38.5 1.0 0.15 < r ≤ 0.41 RA1
7/10 3/10 20.0 16.0 38.5 1.0 0.41 < r ≤ 0.68 RA2
8/10 2/10 20.0 16.0 38.5 1.0 0.68 < r ≤ 0.97 RA3
9/10 1/10 20.0 16.0 38.5 1.0 0.97 < r ≤ 1.37 RA4
10/10 0/10 20.0 16.0 38.5 1.0 1.37 ≤ rR A 5
A l lp a y o ﬀ sm e a s u r e di ne u r o s
a: RL, RN and RA respectively for risk lover, neutral and averse.
We have chosen to use the framework provided by Holt and Laury (2002) except that the payoﬀs
have been converted in euros and modiﬁed in order to represent a larger amount of money. In fact,
all payoﬀs for options A and B have been converted in euros and multiplied by 10 compared to
the original task. As a result, the implied range for the CRRA parameter are not modiﬁed. The
payoﬀs we have considered are presented in Table 1. Column 7 in Table 1 provides the implied
CRRA consistent with a subject ﬁrst selecting option B on that decision. For example, a risk
neutral person would select option A in the ﬁrst four rows of Table 1 and option B in the last
6 rows. The last column gives the CRRA code that will be used in the remaining of the paper.
Risk lover preferences correspond to a CRRA parameter smaller than -0.15 whereas a subject will
be risk averse if the CRRA parameter is greater than 0.15. All instructions used are presented in
Appendix B.
Holt and Laury (2002) have examined stake size eﬀects by scaling these payoﬀs by factors up to
90 times the original values. Their general result is that the elicited risk aversion increases with the
size of the stakes. We also test the presence of stake size eﬀects. As a result, subjects have been
asked to complete the same lottery task except that all payoﬀs have been multiplied by a factor 20.
This second task will be called the HL lottery with high payoﬀs, the ﬁrst one being called the HL
lottery with low payoﬀs.
103.2.2 Adaptation of the Eckel and Grossman (EG) experiment
The second lottery task played by subjects is an adaptation of recent task proposed by Eckel
and Grossman (2002,2008) for the elicitation of individual risk attitudes. Eckel and Grossman
(2002,2008) have proposed a simple experiment allowing to measure risk attitude. Their experiment
consists in asking subjects to choose from among six possible gambles the one they prefer. All the
gambles involve a 50/50 chance of a low or high payoﬀ.12 The range of gambles includes a safe
alternative involving a sure payoﬀ with zero variance. The gambles increase in both expected
return and risk (standard deviation of the expected payoﬀ) moving from Gamble 1 to 5. More
risk-averse subjects would choose lower-risk, lower-return gambles.
Table 2: Adaptation of the Eckel and Grossman lottery
Choice Payoﬀ 1 Payoﬀ 2 Implied range CRRA
50/50 gamble of CRRA code
Gamble 1 40 40 r>1.37 RA5
Gamble 2 32 51 0.97<r≤ 1.37 RA4
Gamble 3 24 64 0.68<r≤ 0.97 RA3
Gamble 4 16 78 0.41<r≤ 0.68 RA2
Gamble 5 12 86 0.15<r≤ 0.41 RA1
Gamble 6 8 91.5 -0.15<r≤0.15 RN
Gamble 7 6 92.9 -0.49<r≤ -0.15 RL1
Gamble 8 4 93.4 -0.95<r≤ -0.49 RL2
Gamble 9 1 93.5 r≤-0.95 RL3
A l lp a y o ﬀ sm e a s u r e di ne u r o s
For making possible the comparison with the adapted HL lotteries, we have modiﬁed both
the payoﬀs proposed originally Eckel and Grossman (2002,2008) and the number of gambles the
subjects had to choose among. The payoﬀs have been chosen ﬁrst to get the implied ranges of CRRA
identical to the adapted HL lotteries and second, to have expected payoﬀs similar to the adapted
HL lotteries. Table 2 presents the adapted Eckel and Grosman lottery that will be compared to the
HL one with low payoﬀs. Table 2 also includes CRRA parameters implied by each possible choice
under the assumption of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). In what follows, this task will be
referred as the EG task with low payoﬀs. To examined a payoﬀ size eﬀect, subjects have been asked
to complete the same task but with all payoﬀs multiplied by a factor 20. This second task will be
called the EG task with high payoﬀs. All instructions used for these two tasks are presented in
Appendix B.
12This type of lottery is designed to keep the task as simple as possible. Hence, expected payoﬀs are easy to
calculate since they are linear in risk, measured as the standard deviation of payoﬀs.
113.3 Risk-taking psychological questionnaire
Psychologists have developed tests to assess individual willingness to engage in risky decision-making
across a variety of domains. The Domain-Speciﬁc Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) test provided by Weber
et al. (2002) is an example of such a psychological test. It allows to identify risk preferences for seven
diﬀerent domains (e.g., social, recreational, health, safety, gambling, ethical, and investments). It
has been described as one of the most useful measures of risk propensity across a number of everyday
situations. We have used the simpliﬁed version of this questionnaire proposed by Blais and Weber
(2006). The survey is made of 30 statements for which a subject must indicate the likelihood that
he/she would engage in the described activity or behavior if he/she were to ﬁnd himsel/herself in
that situation. Initially, the DOSPERT scale provides a rating in seven classes from “Extremely
Unlikely” to “Extremely Likely”. We have added two additional classes to be consistent with the
HL and the EG tasks. The DOSPERT scale allows to compute for each individual some scores
measuring his/her risk attitude for ﬁve domains: health and safety (e.g., seatbelt usage, smoking),
social (e.g., confronting one’s coworkers or family members), ethical decisions (e.g., cheating on an
exam, terminating a comatose family member’s life support), ﬁnancial, recreational. The simpliﬁed
version of the DOSPERT test we have used is presented in Appendices A and B. Notice that
psychometric measures of risk attitude have been extensively used in the economic literature on
risk preferences. For instance, Hopfensitz et al. (2008) use a trait measure of sensation seeking, a
risk-propensity scale for various life domains and a general risk attitude question to study willingness
to take risks, with a special focus on the role of aﬀect.
3.4 Self evaluation of risk preferences
Another possible way of measuring individual risk preferences is to rely on the subject to give
an assessment of his willingness to take risks. Due to its simplicity this approach is potentially
attractive for eliciting a reliable all-around measure of risk attitudes across contexts. A serious
concern with the use of this approach is that responses may not be incentive compatible, Dave et
al. (2007). As a result, economists are often skeptical that self-reported personal attitudes and
traits are behaviorally meaningful since various factors, including self-serving biases, inattention,
and strategic motives could cause respondents to distort their reported risk attitudes. This approach
has been recently used by Dohmen et al. (2009) on a large sample representative of the resident
adult population of Germany. Interestingly, Dohmen et al. (2009) ﬁnd that responses to the general
risk question are a reliable predictor of actual risky behavior. Their ﬁndings demonstrate that a
simple, qualitative survey measure can generate a meaningful measure of risk attitudes, which maps
12into actual choices in lotteries with real monetary consequences.13
As a result, one part of the questionnaire has consisted in asking subjects to give an assessment
of their willingness to take risks in various contexts. The ﬁrst question on attitude towards risk
“in general” asked respondents to rank their behavior on a 9 point scale going from n o ta ta l lr i s k y
to more than extremely risky. The next three questions use the same scale and similar wording
but refer to risk attitude in speciﬁc contexts (professional activity, ﬁnancial matters, health). The
questions used are presented in Appendix B.
4 Elicitation of risk preferences
In this section, we present the individual risk measures separately and we compare them with
previously reported measures of risk preferences.
4.1 Elicitation of risk attitude based on lottery choices
In Table 3, we report the distribution of farmers across risk classes using the HL and then EG
adapted experiments.
Table 3: Proportion of subjects by risk class using lottery tasks
CRRA class RA5 RA4 RA3 RA2 RA1 RN RL1 RL2 RL3
CRRA range >1.37 0.97;1.37 0.68;0.97 0.41;0.68 0.15;0.41 -0.15;0.15 -0.49;-0.15 -0.95;-0.49 <-0.95
Adapted Holt and Laury experiment
-low payoﬀs 0.04 0.11 0.07 0.18 0.14 0.21 0.04 0.07 0.14
-high payoﬀs 0.07 0.11 0.14 0.18 0.11 0.21 0.04 0.07 0.07
Adapted Eckel and Grossman experiment
-low payoﬀs 0.29 0.07 0.21 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.21
-high payoﬀs 0.29 0.36 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.07
In the HL experiment, 54% of subjects appear to be risk-averse for low payoﬀs. 21% of the
subjects are risk-neutral and 25% are risk-lover. In case of a high payoﬀ, the subjects appear
slightly more risk averse (60% of the subjects are risk-averse). However, based on a Kornbrot
test, the distribution of subjects across risk classes with low and high payoﬀs are not statistically
diﬀerent.14 This result means that risk aversion measured using the HL experiment is not modiﬁed
13Liu (2008), working on a sample of farmers in China, reports however mixed evidence of using self-reported
attitude as a predictor of risk preferences. In her work, the self-reported attitude appears to be a signiﬁcant predictor
of the individual loss aversion coeﬃcient but it is not signiﬁcant for explaining the elicited risk aversion.
14The Kornbrot test is based on the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test which can be used if data are
distributed non-normally. It allows testing the equality of distributions for matched pairs of observations where the
data are ordinal.
13by the level of the payoﬀ. This result is in line with Holt and Laury (2002) who ﬁnd that individual
behavior is largely unaﬀected when hypothetical payoﬀs are scaled up. Using the midpoint of each
CRRA class15, the mean CRRA coeﬃcient is equal to 0.14 and 0.36 respectively for a low and a high
payoﬀ. Using the Holt and Laury (2002) terminology, subjects appear to be on average risk-neutral
for a low payoﬀ and slightly risk-averse for a high one.
Figure 1 plots the proportion of subjects that choose the safe choice for each decision for the
adapted HL task, both for low and high payoﬀs. As one can see, the proportion of subjects choosing
the safe option A falls as the probability of the higher payoﬀ increases. The average numbers of
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Figure 1: Proportion of safe choices in each decision (HL experiment)
The distribution of risk preference appears to be much more dissymmetric using the EG task than
using the HL one. For low payoﬀs, 75% of subjects are classiﬁed as risk-averse.16 The percentage
reaches 89% for high payoﬀs. Moreover, based on a Kornbrot test we ﬁnd that the distribution of
subjects across risk classes with low and high payoﬀs are statistically diﬀerent (p<0.01). Using the
midpoint of each CRRA class, the mean CRRA coeﬃcient is equal to 0.62 and 1.02 respectively for
a low and a high payoﬀ. Using the Holt and Laury (2002) terminology, subjects appear to be on
average risk averse for low payoﬀs and highly risk-averse for high ones.
15For the RA5 and the RL3 classes, we use 2 and -2 as class midpoints.
16One may attribute this result to the fact that the EG experiment includes a gamble without any risk whereas all
binary lotteries in the HL task are risky. However, compared to Eckel and Grossman (2008), we still ﬁnd a higher
proportion for extreme classes (high risk aversion or high risk seeking attitudes).
14Discussion First, we do ﬁnd a payoﬀ eﬀect aﬀecting risk preference estimates. For a given task
(HL or EG), the mean CRRA coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly higher in the high payoﬀ case. Secondly,
we do ﬁnd a task eﬀect. Farmers appear to be on average signiﬁcantly more risk averse in the EG
task. Third, our CRRA coeﬃcient estimates for French farmers are consistent with the existing
literature dealing with risk preferences of farmers. For instance, in his classic study on Indian
farmers, Binswanger (1980) ﬁnd moderate to high CRRA parameters especially for high-stakes
gambles (above 0.32). More recently, Liu (2008) reports an average CRRA coeﬃcient for Chinese
farmers equal to 0.71. Our estimates are also in line with risk preferences elicited on a wider
population. Working on a representative sample of the Danish population, Andersen et al. (2010)
ﬁnd for instance that the mean CRRA coeﬃcient in the ﬁeld sample is 0.63 (with a 95% conﬁdence
interval between -0.49 and 1.87), while the mean coeﬃcient is 0.79 in the laboratory sample (with
a 95% conﬁdence interval between -0.02 and 1.85).
4.2 Domain-Speciﬁc Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) assessment
In Table 4, we report the results of the DOSPERT questionnaire. The risk-taking scale (which
ranges from 6 to 42) evaluates behavioral intentions, that is, the likelihood with which respondents
might engage in risky behaviors originating from ﬁve domains of life (ethical, ﬁnancial, health/safety,
social, and recreational risks). A low score for a speciﬁc context corresponds to a low willingness to
take risks (risk averse behavior). On the contrary, a high score corresponds to a high willingness to
take risks (risk seeker behavior).
First, the internal consistency estimates (i.e., Cronbach’s alphas) associated with the domain
risk-taking scores ranged from 0.63 to 0.87, and they are similar to the values obtained originally
by Blais and Weber (2006).17 Second, the risk attitude of respondents varies across domains. This
result is in line with the literature in psychology that has shown that there are in fact multiple
ways in which characteristics of the decision maker and/or the situation can aﬀect choices under
risk. Apparent risk taking by the same person in two situations might diﬀer, for example, because
the decision maker perceives the risks and beneﬁts to diﬀer in magnitude in the two domains (e.g.,
in a recreational vs. a ﬁnancial decision). In our study subjects appear to be very risk averse for
ethical and ﬁnancial matters. If a high level of risk aversion for the ﬁnancial domain has been
already documented (see MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1990) for instance), the low willingness to
take risks in the ethical dimension is more surprising. Interestingly, the ranking of risk attitude
17The Cronbach’s alpha is a measure of the internal consistency of a score. It is equal to 0 if all questions entering
into the score computation are independent and 1 if on contrary all questions are perfectly correlated. To be fully
satisfying, one usually consider that the Cronbach’s alpha must be greater than 0.7.
15Table 4: Domain-Speciﬁc Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) scores and correlations for risk-taking
Global Ethical Financial Health/Safety Recreational Social
Mean score 19.66 11.14 16.93 21.39 19.07 29.79
St. dev. 4.83 4.91 6.09 7.10 8.51 6.38
Cronbach’s α 0.87 0.63 0.63 0.70 0.74 0.66
Global Ethical Financial Health/Safety Recreational Social
Global 1.00
Ethical 0.74*** 1.00
Financial 0.70*** 0.45** 1.00
Health/Safety 0.59*** 0.27 0.28 1.00
Recreational 0.78*** 0.68*** 0.50*** 0.28 1.00
Social 0.67*** 0.36* 0.48*** 0.39** 0.33* 1.00
Minimum and maximum scores are 6 (lowest willingness to take risks) and 42 (highest willingness
to take risks), respectively.
Correlations are based on individual DOSPERT scores reported on the 7 point scale where 1
indicates that it is not at all likely that the individual will adopt the speciﬁed behavior and
where 7, on contrary, indicates that the individual will adopt it for sure.
***,**,* for signiﬁcant at 10,5,1% respectively.
across domains is however similar to the one obtained by Blais and Weber (2006) on a sample of
French respondents. Lastly, the second part of Table 4 shows that most of the pairwise correlations
across DOSPERT scores are large and highly signiﬁcant. A high willingness to take risks in one
domain is associated with a high willingness to take risk in another one. This suggests the existence
of a stable, underlying risk trait as found by Dohmen et al. (2009).
4.3 Subjective assessment of risk attitude
Mean responses for each context-speciﬁc question and correlations are reported in Table 5. The
results suggest that the self evaluation attitudes slightly depend upon the context. The ranking of
mean risk attitudes (from low risk toward high risk) is as follows: ﬁnancial, health, global, profes-
sional. Dohmen et al. (2009) have conducted a similar analysis considering six possible contexts
(general, career, sports and leisure, car driving, health and ﬁnancial matters). Very interestingly,
they report that the lowest individual willingness to take risk is found for ﬁnancial matters and for
health. The highest level of risk taking correspond to decisions related to the professional life. 64%
of the farmers consider their professional behavior as being between risky and more than extremely
risky. The percentage drops to 45% and 39% respectively for the health and the ﬁnancial domains.
One possible explanation could be that our subjects (farmers) are used to managing risks in their
16Table 5: Self evaluation of risk attitudes by domain and correlations across domains
Global Professional Financial Health
Mean self evaluation 4.71 4.96 4.25 4.53
St. dev. 1.08 1.23 1.71 1.73
Global 1.00
Professional 0.38** 1.00
Financial 0.34* 0.32* 1.00
Health 0.55*** 0.36* 0.32* 1.00
Self evaluation varies from 1 if the subject indicates a not at all risky behavior
to 9 if the subject consider his behavior as being more than extremely risky.
***,**,* for signiﬁcant at 10,5,1% respectively.
professional life (either production risks such as climatic conditions or market risks). Hence, they
may be more willing to take some risks. Another explanation could be that farmers can be classiﬁed
as entrepreneurs, a category known to have speciﬁc risk preferences as discussed in Sarasvathy et
al. (1998). On important consequence is that a measure of risk attitude in the context of ﬁnancial
risks should be taken with caution for being used directly in the context of a professional decision.
The second part of Table 5 demonstrates that risk attitudes are not perfectly correlated across
contexts. However, the pairwise correlations are large and all are highly signiﬁcant. This is sug-
gestive of a stable, underlying risk trait. This result is in line with the ﬁndings of Dohmen et al.
(2009).
5 Stability of risk attitude measures across elicitation techniques
In this section, we analyze the consistency of risk attitude measures across the diﬀerent elicitation
techniques we have used (experimental tasks, psychological questionnaire and self evaluation).
5.1 Stability of risk attitude across lottery tasks
First, we compare the risk preferences elicited through the HL and the EG experiments in order to
identify a possible task eﬀect. Second, we use our data to distinguish subjects who are attributed
consistent risk preferences across tasks18, and we relate the stability of risk preferences to some
observable characteristics of subjects.
First, we do ﬁnd a task eﬀect on the subjects risk preference measures. The average CRRA
18Preferences are consistent or stable across tasks if CRRA classes obtained with the HL of the EG tasks are the
same.
17estimates are signiﬁcantly greater with the EG experiments than with the HL ones. Moreover,
using Kornbrot tests, we ﬁnd that the distribution of subjects across risk classes obtained by the HL
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Figure 2: Subjects CRRA centroides using adapted HL and EG tasks
provides a scatter plot of the CRRA centroides obtained by the HL task and by the EG task. If the
risk preferences were exactly the same using the two elicitation techniques, all observations should
lay on the 45 degree line. This is not the case, even though the observations are not located too
far away from this line. Only 20.4% and 11.7% of subjects appear to have stable risk preferences
respectively, for low and high payoﬀs. However, if we count subjects falling within one CRRA
class higher or lower in each task, stability of preferences is observed with low and high payoﬀs
respectively in 57.1% and 39.3% of the cases.
It should however be noticed that attitudes towards risk are signiﬁcantly correlated across elic-
itation techniques. The correlation between the CRRA coeﬃcients obtained using the HL and the
EG tasks are respectively 0.40 (p-value=0.0317) and 0.67 (p-value=0.0001) for low and high payoﬀs.
Using simple OLS, we have regressed the CRRA centroides obtained by the HL tasks on the CRRA
centroides obtained by the EG tasks. The coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at 1% both for low and high
payoﬀ cases (0.78 and 0.57 respectively). This result indicates that risk preference ranking seems
to be preserved across tasks.
We do observe a task eﬀect but elicited risk preferences appear to be more stable than what has
19Another explanation of this result would be that farmer’s are not characterized by CRRA utility functions as
assumed here.
18been reported in the existing literature. Hence, our results slightly diﬀer from the previous literature
which has usually found that the degree of risk aversion of an individual may vary across elicitation
techniques.20 One possible explanation for explaining our ﬁndings is that our individual sample
(French farmers) is more homogeneous in terms of socioeconomic characteristics than the samples
used in previous studies. Moreover, farmers are used to take decisions in a context of uncertainty.
This may reduce the cognitive burden of the lottery tasks. To more formally address the question
of identifying the determinants of risk preference stability, we use a simple discrete choice model
where the endogenous variable is a dummy variable equal to one if preferences are stable across the
two tasks.
Table 6: Results of Logit model explaining preference stability across tasks
Variable Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.)
Age 0.167∗ (0.101)
Children 0.981 (0.744)
Other activity -2.659∗∗ (1.221)
Education+ -0.565 (1.277)
Low payoﬀ 1.076 (0.881)
Size+ -2.515 (1.651)
Average CRRA class 0.319 (0.243)
Intercept -11.385∗∗ (5.736)
Age: age of the subject
Children: number of children
Other activity: dummy if the subject has a secondary professional activity
Education+: dummy if education level beyond secondary school
Low payoﬀ: dummy for tasks with low payoﬀs
Size+: dummy for large farm (>180ha)
Average CRRA class: average CRRA class obtained using HL and EG tasks
***,**,* for signiﬁcant at 10,5,1% respectively.
Pseudo R2: 0.25.
In Table 6, we report the results of a Logit model use for explaining preference stability across
tasks. Older subjects tend to have more stable preferences than the rest of the sample. Subjects
having a secondary professional activity have more instable preferences. The level of education does
not seem to have a signiﬁcant impact on the stability of preferences. This means that the argument
of cognitive diﬃculty more easily addressed by more educated subjects is not an explanation of
preference instability. The average CRRA class has a positive impact on the preference stability:
risk loving subjects have more stable preferences than the rest of the sample. One should however
be careful with this interpretation since the coeﬃcient associated to the average CRRA class is not
20Isaac and James (2000) ﬁnd that risk attitudes diﬀer between ﬁrst price auctions and the Becker-DeGroot-
Marschak procedure. Dave et al. (2007) report that the EG mechanism and the HL task give signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
estimates.
19signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
5.2 Experimental tasks, self-evaluation and psychological questionnaire
The recent work by Deck et al. (2008) has suggested that the instability of risk preferences across
experimental tasks could be related to the fact that risk attitudes may vary depending on the
context. In this paragraph, we explore this possible explanation by analyzing the consistency
between CRRA estimates from the lottery tasks, DOSPERT scores and self evaluation of risk
preferences.
Table 7: Risk attitude Spearman’s rank correlations across elicitation methods
DOSPERT scores Subjective assessment
Gen. Eth. Fin. H&S Recr. Soc. Gen. Prof. Fin. Health
HL low payoﬀs -0.06 -0.26* 0.15 -0.22 0.03 -0.14 0.01 -0.28 0.15 0.02
HL high payoﬀs 0.33* 0.10 0.26* -0.07 0.27* 0.22 0.18 -0.11 0.09 0.09
EG low payoﬀs 0.30 0.21 0.32* -0.04 0.35* 0.16 0.01 -0.01 0.41** 0.09
EG high payoﬀs 0.40* 0.18 0.28* 0.15 0.45** 0.25 0.07 0.33* 0.42** 0.34*
***,**,* for signiﬁcant at 10,5,1% respectively.
In Table 7, we report the Spearman’s rank correlation coeﬃcients between the CRRA classes
obtained with the two types of lotteries (HL and EG) on one hand, and the DOSPERT scores and
the subjective assessment on the other hand.
We ﬁrst ﬁnd that the HL measures of risk preferences are only very slightly correlated with the
DOSPERT scores or with the subjective assessment of individuals. In case of low payoﬀs, the CRRA
class is only signiﬁcantly correlated with the ethical DOSPERT score but the correlation appears to
be negative. In case of high payoﬀs, the CRRA class is signiﬁcantly correlated with the DOSPERT
scores corresponding to the ﬁnancial and the recreational dimensions, and also with the global
score. The Spearman’s rank correlation coeﬃcients between the EG measures of risk preferences
and the DOSPERT scores or the subjective assessment appear to be higher. The DOSPERT score
corresponding to the ﬁnancial and the recreational dimensions are signiﬁcantly correlated with the
EG measure of risk preferences, both in the case of low and high payoﬀs. The subjective assessment
for the ﬁnancial domain are signiﬁcantly correlated with the EG measure of risk preferences, both
in the case of low and high payoﬀs. Interestingly, in case of high payoﬀs the EG measure of risk
preferences appears to be signiﬁcantly correlated with the subjective assessment for the professional
domain.
Our results are in line with previous studies showing that the risk attitude elicited through
20lotteries often correlates with risk attitude towards investments. Deck et al. (2008) demonstrate
for instance that the more willing a person is to invest income in a very speculative stock, the less
risk averse he will appear as measured by the Holt and Laury task.
5.3 Self-evaluation and psychological questionnaire
In this paragraph, we analyze the consistency of risk preferences obtained with the psychological
questionnaire and with the subjective assessment.
Table 8: Spearman’s rank correlations between DOSPERT scores and Subjective assessments
DOSPERT scores
Global Ethical Financial H&S Recreational Social
Sub. Ass. Global 0.36* 0.20 0.40** 0.07 0.10 0.44**
Sub. Ass. Professional 0.34* 0.12 0.28 0.29 0.31* 0.37**
Sub. Ass. Finance 0.28 0.05 0.54*** 0.09 0.11 0.31
Sub. Ass. Health 0.63*** 0.29 0.46*** 0.57** 0.40** 0.37*
***,**,* for signiﬁcant at 10,5,1% respectively.
Table 8 reports the Spearman’s rank correlation coeﬃcients between the DOSPERT scores
and the subjective assessment of risk attitude. The correlation between the global measure of
risk preferences provided by the two approaches is high and signiﬁcant at 10%. Interestingly,
the DOSPERT score for the ﬁnancial domain is highly correlated with the subjective assessment of
individuals for the ﬁnance domain. The same result is found for the health domain. Those evidences
suggest that relying on subjects to give an assessment of their willingness to take risks is a simple
but reliable way to elicit some measure of risk attitudes across contexts. Our result is in line with
the recent work by Dohmen et al. (2009) who ﬁnd that a simple, qualitative survey measure can
generate a meaningful measure of risk attitudes, which maps into actual choices in lotteries with
real monetary consequences.
5.4 Analyzing the determinants of risk attitudes
As demonstrated by Deck et al. (2008), individual diﬀerences may help explain the apparent
within-subject inconsistency between diﬀerent behavioral measures of risks. This is the assumption
we test by assessing if some observed characteristics of the respondent (personality or socioeconomic
characteristics) have a signiﬁcant impact on the estimates risk attitudes.
In Table 9, we report the results of the interval regressions for the CRRA classes obtained with
the HL and the EG lotteries. By using interval regressions, we specify the dependent variable as a
21Table 9: Interval regressions for CRRA classes
Eckel and Grossman task Holt and Laury task
low payoﬀs high payoﬀs low payoﬀs high payoﬀs
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Age -0.040 0.042 -0.017 0.022 -0.019 0.020 -0.049∗∗∗ 0.017
Children 0.375 0.366 0.408∗∗ 0.194 0.127 0.179 -0.116 0.146
Education+ -0.612 0.823 -0.329 0.430 -0.106 0.406 -0.713∗∗ 0.329
Income -0.556 0.680 0.104 0.324 -0.604∗ 0.329 -0.144 0.243
Intercept 8.426 8.074 0.042 3.889 7.759∗∗ 3.921 4.621 2.919
Age: age of the subject
Children: number of children
Education+: dummy if education level beyond secondary school
Income: farm level production value of the previous year (in euros)
***,**,* for signiﬁcant at 10, 5 and 1% respectively.
range deﬁned by the subject’s lower and upper bounds of the risk preference parameter. As a result
it allows to account for cases where the data are right or left-censored (e.g., the range is bounded
by inﬁnity). As potential determinants, we include the age of the respondent (Age), the number of
children (Children), the level of education (Education+) and the respondent income (Income).
Globally, the predictive power of the models is relatively low, especially in the case of low payoﬀs
however the signs of the variables make sense. Being older results in more risk-seeker behaviors for
all lotteries. The relationship between age and risk preference is however signiﬁcant only for the
HL task with high payoﬀs. Respondents having a lot children tend to be much more risk averse.
Hence, the coeﬃcient associated to (Children) is positive in all cases but signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero only in the EG task with high payoﬀs. A high level of education and a high level of income is
associated to risk seeking behaviors. Notice that we cannot test for a gender eﬀect since our sample
is exclusively made of men.
6C o n c l u s i o n
There has been a recent surge in research to bring laboratory experiments to ﬁeld subjects in order
to complement the main conclusions obtained in traditional laboratory experiments. Although
ﬁeld experiments can be viewed as less controlled variants of a laboratory experiment, they may
appear relevant for some research domains like elicitation of preferences and beliefs. Indeed, it can
be important to have non-standard subjects (bankers, entrepreneurs, farmers, etc.) ﬁrst because
elicitated preferences can then be compared to real choices made by individuals and second, because
non-standard subjects may be endowed with past experiences aﬀecting their preferences. Moreover,
if the research is domain-speciﬁc (as it is clearly the case here), it is also important to consider
22subjects that are directly aﬀected by the domain.
In this paper, we have contributed to the literature on risk preference stability by comparing
diﬀerent elicitation procedures on the same sample of non-standard subjects. Our sample is made
of 30 French farmers having completed three types of elicitation tasks: two multiple price list
choices based on the Holt and Laury and on the Eckel and Grossman experiments, a risk-taking
psychological questionnaire initially proposed by Weber et al. (2002) dealing with risk behavior in
ﬁve domains (health and safety, social, ethical, ﬁnancial, recreational) and a self-evaluation of risk
preferences in four domains (general, professional, ﬁnance, health). We have then compared farmer
risk attitudes elicited through the various elicitation methods.
The main empirical results are the following. First, within the class of lottery choice tasks, risk
preference evaluations are aﬀected by the experimental framework, even if attitudes towards risk
are signiﬁcantly correlated across elicitation techniques. Responses to the Holt and Laury’s format
indicate a lower risk aversion than responses with the Eckel and Grossman’s format. However, risk
preference ranking remains stable across tasks. Some robust results for the population of interest
have been obtained. For instance, a majority of farmers appear to be risk averse and risk aversion
is particularly high in case of high payoﬀs. Second, we provide some evidences on the fact that risk
preferences are context-dependent. Using the the psychological questionnaire, we ﬁnd that the risk
attitude measures elicited through traditional experiments often correlate with risk attitude towards
investments. It appears that subjects view the traditional task as an investment. For instance, in
the psychological questionnaire the more likely a subject is willing to invest “income in a moderate
growth mutual fund”, the more risk averse she will appear using by both the Holt and Laury’s
experiment or the Eckel and Grossman’s experiment. Lastly, we observe a signiﬁcant correlation
between the self evaluation of risk attitude and the measures provided by the lottery choices and by
the psychological questionnaire. This result suggests that a simple qualitative self-reported measure
can generate a meaningful evaluation of risk attitudes, which maps into actual choices in lotteries
tasks.
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26A Experimental protocol for risk preference elicitation
We employ two experimental Multiple Price List (MPL) procedures for eliciting attitudes towards
risk, based on Holt and Laury (2002) and on Eckel and Grossman (2002). We also use a risk-taking
psychological questionnaire, and a series of risk preference self-evaluation questions. All subjects
have voluntarily participated to the four treatments of the experience.
In the ﬁrst treatment, called the Holt and Laury’s treatment, subjects were provided with a series
of binary choices for two tasks. The ﬁrst task involved ten sequential choices between risky lotteries
in the domain of gains. The second task is similar except that all payoﬀs have been multiplied by
twenty.
In the second treatment, called the Eckel and Grossman’s treatment, subjects had to complete
two tasks. In each task, the subject had to select a preferred lottery between 9 possible ones. All
lotteries had diﬀerent levels of payoﬀs but the same probabilities. The second task is similar except
that all payoﬀs were been multiplied by twenty.
In the third treatment, called the psychological questionnaire, subjects complete the DOSPERT
test Weber, Blais, and Betz (2002) modiﬁed by Blais and Weber (2006)). This psychological ques-
tionnaire contains thirty items allowing to assess the likelihood of adopting a risky behavior in ﬁve
diﬀerent domains (health and safety, social, ethical, ﬁnancial, recreational). For each item, subjects
are asked to rate their behavior with respect to the risky activity described. Speciﬁcally, subjects
report how likely they are to engage in a certain risk-related activity on a nine-point rating scale
ranging from 1 (“Not at all likely”) to 9 (“Certain”). These questions provide us with a psychometric
measure of individual risk attitude for the ﬁve diﬀerent domains.
Finally, in the fourth treatment, subjects were required to complete a series of four questions
concerning their self-evaluation of risk attitudes. For each question, subjects report how they
consider their behavior and decision as risky on a nine-point scale ranging from 1 (“Not at all
risky”) to 9 (“More than extremely risky”).
27B  Experimental protocol  
 
In this Appendix, we present the instructions and the protocol we have used for eliciting risk 
preferences.  
 
The first part presents the instructions read to each subject. It gives also the scoreless tasks that have 
been realized by each subject to insure a good comprehension of the protocol. The second part of this 
appendix presents the four tasks completed by each subject.  
 
Notice that both the instructions and the different tasks have been translated from French to English. 
 




Some decisions taken by a farmer on his farm are linked to technical constraints. Some decisions are 
however very individual in the sense that they may result from specific objectives of the farmer. 
Among these objectives, we focus in this protocol on how you manage risks, either climate risk or 
risks associated with fluctuations in crop prices or input costs. 
  
 
We know that individuals placed in similar risky context do not take the same decisions simply 
because they are not ready to take the same risks. We all know people that can be described as 
"prudent" and others for whom the adjective "risk-taker" is more appropriate. 
 
 
The experience you will participate will allow us to better understand your behaviour vis-à-vis risk. 
The tests you will pass will then allow us to assess how you behave in risky situations. 
  
 
In tests 1 and 2, we discuss situations of financial risks using "lotteries". These lotteries are used in 
economics in order to make people reveal their preferences for situations more or less. 
  
 
However, we all know that the same individual may behave differently depending on the nature of 
risks. A farmer may have a "risky" behaviour for financial investments but may take much more 
"prudent" decision regarding its work. That's what we try to look at in the third test which will come in 
the form of a series of 30 questions. Some questions may seem strange or surprising, but this 
questionnaire has global coherence. We will qualitatively assess your attitude to risk in four domains: 
  
- Ethical 
- Financial  
- Health  
- Social  
 
It is important to us that you answer all questions, while knowing that your answers will be treated 
anonymously and will remain completely confidential.  
 
 
In the last test, we will ask you to evaluate your behaviour for different risks. This will allow us to see 
how your assessment differs from measurements obtained from the first three tests. 
  28Setting of the protocol 
 
 
You'll need to answer several successive questions in four tests. We first present the type of questions 
you will need to respond. 
 
TEST 1: CHOICE OF LOTTERY 
 
Objective 
In test 1 we consider situations of financial risks using "lotteries". These lotteries are used in 
economics in order to make people reveal their preferences for situations more or less risky. All 




In test 1, we offer 2 series of 9 lottery choice. For each row, two gains are possible (a low gain or a 
high gain) with identical probabilities. You are asked to enter your favourite row among the 9 by 
checking the appropriate box. 
 
Example 
  Gains Probability  Your  choice 
    
Lottery 1  40 €  50%   
  40 €  50%   
     
Lottery 2  32 €  50%   
  51 €  50%   
     
Lottery 3  24 €  50%   
  64 €  50%   
     
Lottery 4  16 €  50%   
  78 €  50%   
     
Lottery 5  12 €  50%   
  86 €  50%   
     
Lottery 6  8 €  50%   
 91,5  €  50%   
    
Lottery 7  6 €  50%   
 92,9  €  50%   
    
Lottery 8  4 €  50%   
 93,4  €  50%   
    
Lottery 9  1 €  50%   
 93,5  €  50%   
 
For example, if you choose the 4 lottery, you have 50% chance of winning 78 Euros and 50% chance 
to win 16 Euros. 
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TEST 2: CHOICE OF LOTTERY 
 
Objective 




During this test, we will propose several times two lotteries (Lottery A or Lottery B). Each time, you 
must indicate which of the 2 lotteries you prefer. 
 
Note that there is no right or wrong answer. Your choice should really be guided by your preferences. 
  




Which lottery do you prefer? 
 
Lottery A  Lottery B 
  











Please choose between Lottery A or Lottery B by checking A or B. 
 
For example, if you choose Lottery A, you have 10% chance of winning 20 Euros and 90% chance to 
win 16 Euros. 
 
 





This questionnaire will allow us to qualitatively assess your attitude for different types of risks 
(ethical, financial, health, social). Some questions may seem strange or surprising, but this 
questionnaire has global coherence. It is important to us that you answer all questions, while knowing 




The test 3 includes 30 questions for which you must indicate your level of risk taking among 9 
possible levels. 
 
  30For each statement asked, you must indicate the likelihood that you take part in the activity specified 
or you adopt the behaviour specified if you were in the situation described. 
 
You must then choose one of the 9 options ranging from "Not at all likely" to "Certain" by using the 
scale. 
 
1  2  3 4  5 6  7  8  9 










Extremely  likely  Certain 
 
 
             
 
  Example 
 
 
Admitting that your tastes are different from those of a friend. 
 
1  2  3 4  5 6  7  8  9 












Extremely  likely  Certain 
 
 
             
 
Put a mark in the box corresponding to your behaviour. 
 
 




In the last test, we will ask you to evaluate subjectively your behaviour for different risks. This will 




In test 4, we will ask you how you ti evaluate your behaviour and your attitude for different types of 
risk on a scale going from 1 (not at all risky) to 9 (extremely risky behaviour). 
 
  Example 
 
In general, you would describe your behaviour and the decisions you make as: 
 
1 2  3 4  5 6  7  8  9 















Extremely  risky 
 
 
              
 
Put a cross in the box corresponding to your behaviour. 
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TEST 1: CHOICE OF LOTTERY 
 
 
In test 1, we offer 2 series of 9 lottery choice. For each row, two gains are possible (a low gain or a 
high gain) with identical probabilities. You are asked to enter your favourite row among the 9 by 
checking the appropriate box. 
 
 
Test 1. Q 1. 
 
Put a mark for your preferred lottery 
 
  Gains Probabilities  Your  choice 
    
Lottery 1  40 €  50%   
  40 €  50%   
     
Lottery 2  32 €  50%   
  51 €  50%   
     
Lottery 3  24 €  50%   
  64 €  50%   
     
Lottery 4  16 €  50%   
  78 €  50%   
     
Lottery 5  12 €  50%   
  86 €  50%   
     
Lottery 6  8 €  50%   
 91,5  €  50%   
    
Lottery 7  6 €  50%   
 92,9  €  50%   
    
Lottery 8  4 €  50%   
 93,4  €  50%   
    
Lottery 9  1 €  50%   
 93,5  €  50%   
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Test 1. Q 2. 
 
Put a mark for your preferred lottery 
 
  Gains Probabilities  Your  choice 
    
Lottery 1  800 €  50%   
  800 €  50%   
     
Lottery 2  640 €  50%   
  1020 €  50%   
     
Lottery 3  480 €  50%   
  1280 €  50%   
     
Lottery 4  320 €  50%   
  1560 €  50%   
     
Lottery 5  240 €  50%   
  1720 €  50%   
     
Lottery 6  160 €  50%   
 1830  €  50%   
    
Lottery 7  120 €  50%   
 1858  €  50%   
    
Lottery 8  80 €  50%   
 1868  €  50%   
    
Lottery 9  20 €  50%   
 1870  €  50%   
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During this test, we will propose several times two lotteries (Lottery A or Lottery B). Each 
time, you must indicate which of the two lotteries you prefer.  Note that there is no right or 
wrong answer. Your choice should really be guided by your preferences.  
  
This test consists of 20 lottery choices divided into two independent parts.  
 




st Part: 10 questions 
 
Test 2. Q 1. Choose you preferred lottery 
Lottery A  Lottery B 
  










Test 2. Q 2. Choose you preferred lottery 
Lottery A  Lottery B 
  










Test 2. Q 3. Choose you preferred lottery 














Test 2. Q 4. Choose you preferred lottery 
 










  A    B   
 
 
Test 2. Q 5. Choose you preferred lottery 
 









  A    B   
 
 
est 2. Q 6. Choose you preferred lottery  T
 














  A    B   
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Test 2. Q 8. Choose you preferred lottery 
 
Lottery A  Lottery B 
 
 




Test 2. Q 9. Choose you preferred lottery 
 
  A    B   
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Test 2. Q 10. Choose you preferred lottery 
Lottery B 
 










nd Part: 10 questions 
 
Test 2. Q 11. Choose you preferred lottery 
 
Lottery A  Lottery B 
 
  A    B   
 
 
Test 2. Q 12. Choose you preferred lottery 
 
Lottery A  Lottery B 
 
  A    B   
 
 
Test 2. Q 13. Choose you preferred lottery 
 

































  38Test 2. Q 14. Choose you preferred lottery 
 









   B    A  
 
 




   
 Choose you preferred lottery 
Lottery A 
A   B   
 
 
Test 2. Q 16. Choose you preferred lottery 
 
Lottery A  Lottery B 
320 € 400 € 





















  39Test 2. Q 17. Choose you preferred lottery 
 
Lottery A  Lottery B 
320 € 







  A    B   
 
 
Test 2. Q 18. Choose you preferred lottery 
 











  A    B   
 
 
Test 2. Q 19. Choose you preferred lottery 
 















  40Test 2. Q 20. Choose you preferred lottery 
 






  A    B   
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This questionnaire will allow us to qualitatively assess your attitude for different types of risks 
(ethical, financial, health, social). Some questions may seem strange or surprising, but this 
questionnaire has global coherence. It is important to us that you answer all questions, while knowing 
that your answers will be treated anonymously and will remain completely confidential. 
 
The test 3 includes 30 questions for which you must indicate your level of risk taking among 9 
possible levels. For each statement asked, you must indicate the likelihood that you take part in the 
activity specified or you adopt the behaviour specified if you were in the situation described. You 
must then choose one of the 9 options ranging from "Not at all likely" to "Some (e)" by using the 
scale. 
 
1  2  3 4  5 6  7  8  9 










Extremely  likely  Certain 
 
 
             
 
 
Question  Your choice 
(1 to 9) 
1. Admitting that your tastes are different from those of a friend.  
2. Going camping in the wilderness.  
3. Betting a day's income at the horse races.  
4. Investing 10% of your annual income in a moderate growth mutual fund.  
5. Drinking heavily at a social function.  
6. Taking some questionable deductions on your income tax return.  
7. Disagreeing with an authority figure on a major issue.  
8. Betting a day's income at a high-stake poker game.  
9. Having an affair with a married man/woman.  
10. Passing off somebody else's work as your own.  
11. Going down a ski run that is beyond your ability.  
12. Investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock.  
13. Going whitewater rafting at high water in the spring.  
14. Betting a day's income on the outcome of a sporting event  
15. Engaging in unprotected sex.  
16. Revealing a friend's secret to someone else.  
17. Driving a car without wearing a seat belt.  
18. Investing 10% of your annual income in a new business venture.  
19. Taking a skydiving class.  
20. Riding a motorcycle without a helmet.  
21. Choosing a career that you truly enjoy over a more secure one. 
22. Speaking your mind about an unpopular issue in a meeting at work.  
23. Sunbathing without sunscreen.  
24. Bungee jumping off a tall bridge.  
25. Piloting a small plane.  
26. Walking home alone at night in an unsafe area of town.  
27. Moving to a city far away from your extended family.  
28. Starting a new career in your mid-thirties.  
29. Leaving your young children alone at home while running an errand.  
30. Not returning a wallet you found that contains €200.  
 
Note: In fact each question was followed by a table presenting the 9 options. To save 
space we have modified the presentation and we put all question is one table. 
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Now, we ask you to evaluate your behaviour for different type of risks on a scale going from 
1 (behaviour not at all risky) to 9 (behaviour more than extremely risky). 
 
 
Test 4. Q1. In general, would you say that your behaviour and the decisions you take are: 
 
1 2  3  4 5  6  7  8  9 














              
 
 
Test 4. Q2. For your professional activity, would you say that your behaviour and the 
decisions you take are: 
 
1 2  3  4 5  6  7  8  9 














              
 
 
Test 4. Q3. With regards to finance, would you say that your behaviour and the decisions you 
take are: 
 
1 2  3  4 5  6  7  8  9 














              
 
Test 4. Q4. With regards to health, would you say that your behaviour and the decisions you 
take are: 
 
1 2  3  4 5  6  7  8  9 



















THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP !!! 